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         Several corporate governance rating agencies in recent years have introduced quantitative 
measures of corporate governance rating for publicly traded firms. Firms invest significant 
resources to be rated by such agencies as they anticipate potential benefits for investors. One 
potential benefit is the reduction in information asymmetry between firms and investors. We 
examine the cross-sectional relation between commercial corporate governance ratings of firms 
and their contemporaneous information asymmetry proxies. We use two leading governance 
rating agencies; Governance Metrics International (GMI) and Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) and six information asymmetry proxies and find a significant relation between the ratings 
and several measures of information asymmetry.  We, however, find no significant impact on 
information asymmetry level of firms around the first time they get rated.  In addition, contrary to 
our expectations, we find a negative significant relation between highly rated firms and the 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date but insignificant relation for low or 
moderately rated firms.  Overall, our results suggest that governance ratings are related to the 
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Corporate governance ratings have gained popularity ever since accounting scandals like Enron 
and WorldCom took place in 2001 and 2002, respectively. Following these incidents, stock 
markets around the world embarked upon reforms such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act (in US) and 
the Higgs Report (in UK) to restore investor confidence. Among the leading corporate 
governance rating agencies, The Corporate Library (hereafter referred to as TCL) in 1999 and 
Governance Metrics International (hereafter referred to as GMI) in 2000, emerged as the first 
players in the industry. They were followed by S&P’s Standard and Poor) Gamma score and 
Institutional Shareholder Services’ (hereafter referred to as ISS) corporate governance quotient in 
2002
1
. Most of the leading governance rating service providers claim to provide a single score, 
which is a comprehensive measure of the effectiveness and risks associated with governance 
mechanisms of firms.  
In this paper we investigate the usefulness of these ratings. Since firms pay a fee to get rated and 
disclose their governance related information to the rating agencies, they must have the incentive 
to disclose this information in terms of a positive signal to the markets. Ratings scores potentially 
capture the quality of the corporate governance structure of the firm.  Good governance, among 
other things, is related to more transparency in the dissemination of corporate information and 
better monitoring of corporate activity.  We, therefore, believe corporate governance ratings to be 
related to the firms’ information asymmetry. In the governance literature, we observe a gap in 
terms of examining the link between information asymmetry and governance ratings. For 
instance, Aggarwal et al. (2006) use ISS data to examine the relationship between firm value and 
64 governance related inputs to the ratings. Brown & Caylor (2006) examine the relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and a governance index created by summing 51 governance variables 
collected by ISS. Their results show that their own governance index was significantly related to 




firms’ contemporaneous Tobin’s Q for the year β00β. Brown & Caylor (β004) report that high 
ISS corporate governance ratings are associated with higher current stock returns, higher 
accounting returns, lower volatility, and higher dividends – the study however provides no 
evidence on the ability of corporate governance ratings to predict future firm outcomes.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife & LaFond (β006) examine whether GMI’s governance ratings are related to the 
cost of equity capital in research sponsored by GMI – their results show that higher GMI 
governance ratings were associated with lower cost of equity capital in 2004. It should be noted 
that they do not report whether the current ratings predict future cost of capital. Similarly, 
Derwall & Verwijmeren (β007) find that GMI’s governance ratings for β005 are negatively 
related with cost of equity capital, firm specific and systematic risk. Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) 
show that commercial ratings by TCL, GMI, and ISS have no predictive power for predicting 
future firm performance. However, a few sub scores of these ratings are predictive of future firm 
performance. Their firm performance measure is divided into two broad categories; primary and 
secondary. Their primary measure includes operating performance and stock returns and their 
secondary measure relates to four unfortunate corporate events; propensity to delist, likelihood of 
bankruptcy, exposure to class action lawsuits, and exposure to accounting related SEC 
enforcement actions.  
Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011) use GMI data for firms in 22 developed countries and find a 
significant positive relation between firm-level governance scores and firm valuation. The most 
closely related study to our study is the one by Wan (2010). He looks at how corporate 
governance affects information asymmetry in capital markets through its effect on disclosure 
method. They find that if the practice of selective disclosure is forbidden, firm-level corporate 
governance will have minimum effect on firms’ information asymmetry. Cai, Lui, and Qian 
(2009) investigate the effects of information asymmetry on three governance mechanisms; the 
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intensity of board monitoring, exposure to market discipline, and CEO pay-for performance 
relationship.  
As discussed above, we observe a clear lack of studies relating governance ratings with market 
micro-structure. Most of the past literature has focussed on the link between governance ratings 
and firm performance (Aggarwal et. al. β009), firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) (Brown and Caylor, 
2006 and Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid, 2011), stock returns, accounting returns, volatility 
(Brown and Caylor, 2006), cost of equity capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife & LaFond, 2006), risk 
(Derwall & Verwijmeren, 2007) and the predictive power in terms of stock returns (Daines, Gow, 
and Larcker, 2010). We believe that the link between governance ratings and information 
asymmetry holds primary importance as the effects on stock returns, firm valuation, and cost of 
equity capital will only exist if the market takes ratings information into account. If the ratings 
information is not assimilated in the market it’s impossible for the above mentioned effects to 
materialize. The link between governance ratings and information asymmetry holds primary 
importance due to two main reasons; first, governance ratings can affect stock returns only if they 
affect information asymmetry and second, if ratings information is not assimilated in the market 
it’s impossible for the people to react in any way. Therefore, we got motivated to investigate this 
‘missing’ link in governance ratings literature. To our knowledge, no other researcher has directly 
addressed the question of the possible link between governance ratings and information 
asymmetry.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the cross-sectional relation between firms’ corporate 
governance ratings and their information asymmetry. We test the usefulness of these ratings for 
firms by taking a market micro-structure perspective. We believe that in today’s environment, 
information about a firms’ governance is very important and rating announcements should affect 
a firm’s information asymmetry. 
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In the first part of our paper, we investigate the cross-sectional relation between governance 
ratings by GMI and ISS (index score and industry score) against analyst related (dispersion in 
analyst forecast, forecast error, normalized forecast error, number of analyst) and market related 
(bid-ask spread and share turnover) information asymmetry proxies. We also control for firm 
size, tangibility, leverage, and profitability. In the second part we investigate the effect of initial 
ratings announcements and if they have any significant cumulative abnormal returns around the 
event or if there is a significant change in information asymmetry level around the rating 
announcements.  
The thesis is divided as follow; the second sections discusses some of the pertinent literature, 
section 3 develops the hypotheses tested in the study, section 4 describes the data sources and 
limitations, section 5 provides a detailed description of the ratings methodology of the 
commercial rating firms under consideration of this thesis, section 6 explains the methodology 
employed in this paper, section 7 presents and discusses the  empirical results, while the last 





Chapter 1: Literature Review 
Increasing concern about firms’ corporate governance led rating agencies to design quantitative 
measures of corporate governance quality.  In addition to the efforts of rating agencies, 
considerable research has also been done in the area of corporate governance. Ample research 
provides us with mixed evidence regarding the usefulness of commercial rating agencies. Also, 
the governance ratings literature has not investigated the link between the governance ratings and 
information asymmetry measures. A few academic researchers have, however, attempted to 
combine individual governance elements into a single rating system to determine the overall 
quality of a firm’s governance.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) create an index of shareholder protection around the world and find that it 
correlates with economic growth and market capitalization. Their index is also called ‘anti-
director rights’. Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003) form a governance index (G-Index) to proxy 
for the level of shareholder rights by using governance factors affecting shareholder rights. They 
find that a statistically significant 8.5% return is earned if an investor goes short on firms with 
low shareholder rights and long on firms with stronger shareholder rights. They also find 
correlations between the G-Index and stock returns, firm characteristics (book-to-market ratio, 
firm size, share price, monthly trading volume, Tobin’s Q, dividend yield, S&P 500 inclusion, 
past five-year stock return, past five-year sales growth, percentage of institutional ownership), 
and firm’s operating performance. Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (β009) come up with an E-Index 
that constitutes six components of the G-Index. Brown and Caylor (2006) create a governance 
index created by summing 51 governance variables collected by ISS. 
 
Subsequent researchers have bought the usefulness of the above mentioned indices into question. 
Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006) provide evidence that the G-Index is not related to superior firm 
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performance. On the contrary, Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) find that large abnormal returns 
are generated if investments are benchmarked by six components of the G-Score (called the E-
index). However, recent research by Johnson, Moorman & Sorescu (2009) demonstrates that no 
abnormal returns are generated by the use of G-Index or E-Index when the benchmark asset-
pricing model is adjusted for industry clustering.  
 
Ample research has also been done on ratings provided by commercial governance rating 
agencies. Various researchers have related these indices to firm performance or firms’ stock 
market performance. Linden & Matolcsy (2004), claim that corporate governance ratings have no 
significant relationship with a firm’s financial performance. They also find that these ratings are 
positively related to firm size. On the contrary, Durie (2003) showed that corporate governance 
ratings are relatively good indicators of future firm performance. Various researchers such as 
Larcker, Richardson & Tuna (2007) and Grundy et al. (2003), are unconvinced by the claims of 
usefulness of such governance indices. Turnbull (2001) has highlighted the importance of 
considering governance strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats when analyzing the 
usefulness of corporate governance ratings. Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010) evaluate the 
usefulness of commercial corporate governance ratings by examining GMI, ISS, TCL, and Audit 
Integrity (Accounting and governance risk). They find that these ratings are of no good to 
investors as they don’t have a significant relation with firms’ future performance nor do they have 
economically significant predictive ability. Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) show a positive 
relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation for Korea. Koehn & Ueng (2005) 
examine a sample of 106 large U.S. firms and find no statistically significant relationship between 
corporate governance ratings and Audit Integrity’s measure of earnings quality. Yeh, Lee, and 
Koh (2002) find that firms with good corporate governance show good operating performance 




Brown and Caylor (2006) provide five internal governance provisions that significantly matter for 
firm valuation.  They examine the relationship between Tobin’s Q and an index created by 
summing 51 governance variables collected by ISS. Their results showed that their own index 
was significantly related to the contemporaneous Tobin’s Q for β00β. Aggarwal et al. (2006) 
create an index based on governance attributes that targeted post-SOX regulations to capture how 
corporate governance affects different firm attributes. They use 64 governance attributes used by 
ISS in their governance ratings. They find a positive relation between firm value and their 
governance index. Brown & Caylor (2004) report results associating high ISS corporate 
governance ratings with higher current stock returns, higher accounting returns, lower volatility, 
and higher dividends; the study however provides no evidence on the ability of corporate 
governance ratings to predict future firm outcomes. Gupta, Kennedy, and Weaver (2009) 
investigate Canadian capital markets and find no association between Globe and Mail`s 
governance sub-category ratings and measures of firm value. They examine S&P/TSX firms. 
Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011) use GMI data for firms in 22 developed countries and find a 
significant positive relation between firm-level governance scores and firm valuation.   
 
Ashbaugh-Skaife & LaFond (β006) examine whether GMI’s governance ratings are related to the 
cost of equity capital in research sponsored by GMI; their results show that higher GMI 
governance ratings were associated with lower cost of equity capital in 2004. It should be noted 
that they do not report whether the current ratings predict future cost of capital. Similarly, 
Derwall & Verwijmeren (β007) find that GMI’s governance ratings for β005 are negatively 
related with cost of equity capital, firm specific and systematic risk. 
 
The issue of predictability of commercial corporate governance ratings has also been addressed 
by many. TCL analysts avoid data checklists and rely instead on their experience and private 
assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Bhagat, Bolton & Romano (2007) examine several 
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ratings from TCL (The Corporate Library). Using multivariate analysis and simultaneous 
equations, they report mixed evidence about its ability to predict future operating performance 
and share price appreciation. Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) show that commercial ratings by TCL, 
GMI, and ISS have no predictive power for predicting future firm performance. However, a few 
sub scores of these ratings are predictive of future firm performance. Their firm performance 
measure is divided into two broad categories; primary and secondary. Their primary measure 
includes operating performance and stock returns and their secondary measure relates to four 
unfortunate corporate events; propensity to delist, likelihood of bankruptcy, exposure to class 
action lawsuits, and exposure to accounting related SEC enforcement actions.  Erickson, Hanlon 
& Maydew (2006), show that accounting restatements are positively associated with poor 
governance. In contrast though, Larcker, Richardson & Tuna (2007) are unable to find this 
relationship with their data.  
 
The phenomenon of information asymmetry has long been researched and is well-accepted now. 
It plays an important role especially in understanding capital market’s micro-structure. Moreover, 
various signalling theories have been put forward to explain the behavior of security prices to 
various different pieces of information. Information asymmetry exists in markets where sellers 
and buyers have different levels of information; hence their information is asymmetric. Ross 
(1977) and Spence (1973) were among the earliest researchers to show that investors rely on 
information to value a firm. Recently, LaFond & Watts (2008) studied the information role of 
conservatism and show how information in financial statements reduces information asymmetry 
and increase equity value. This is another example of how an information source reduces 
information asymmetry in capital markets. We can expect the same effect from corporate 
governance ratings. Healy and Palepu (2001) provide an excellent review of research done related 
to corporate disclosure and how it affects information asymmetry in capital markets. They show 
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that firms communicate information about governance and firm performance to outside investors 
through financial reporting. 
 
Previous research, including Leland & Pyle (1977), Thakor (1982) Campbell & Heinkel(1984), 
has identified a number of signaling alternatives that firms employ to resolve or alleviate the 
asymmetric information problem, and rating agencies (which give an overall rating for a firm’s 
stock) are one of them. Hsueh & Liu (1992) and Dichev & Piotroski (2001) have noted that 
smaller firms in the market are less closely followed by market analysts and thus face more 
serious information asymmetry problem. Botosan (1997) provides evidence of a significant 
relationship between firm disclosure and its stock returns. Corporate governance rating also 
represents disclosure and therefore conveys different signals to the market. Hseuh, Chang, and 
Lee (2007) find that the effect of initial credit rating announcements on information asymmetry is 
significant and that it results in positive stock returns or favourable reaction by markets only for 
smaller sized firms in the Taiwanese capital market. Barron, Clare & Thomas (1997) however do 
examine the impact of initial rating announcement effects on a sample of UK firms but do not 
observe any stock price reaction to corporate governance rating announcements. 
 
A related study was done by Chiang (2005) which shows a relationship between information 
transparency (reduced information transparency) and better governance practice for Taiwanese 
high-tech firms. The measure for transparency adopted in their study is the Standard and Poor`s 
transparency criteria. Their study also looks at the relationship between governance indicators 
and operating performance of firms and if these governance indicators have predictive power for 
future operating performance. By transparency, they refer to transparency of ownership structure, 
investor relations, financial transparency, information disclosure, transparency of board 
ownership structure and processes. Corporate transparency is shown to have a significant positive 
relationship with operating performance and that companies with good corporate governance 
10 
 
have good operating performance. Cai, Lui, and Qian (β009) investigate the impact of firms’ 
information asymmetry on their choice of governance mechanism. They test three governance 
mechanisms; the intensity of board monitoring, exposure to market discipline, and CEO pay-for 
performance relationship. Their findings suggest that firms with higher information asymmetry 
tend to chose less intensive board monitoring and greater alignment of CEO incentive with 
performance. The most closely related study to our thesis is the one by Wan (2010). He looks at 
how corporate governance affects information asymmetry in capital markets through its effect on 
disclosure method. They find that if the practice of selective disclosure is forbidden, firm-level 
corporate governance will have minimum effect on firms’ information asymmetry.  
 
Therefore, there is mixed evidence about the usefulness and predictability of governance ratings. 
From the review of past literature above, we can clearly observe a gap in literature as no 
researcher has yet addressed the question of how these ratings are affecting firms’ information 






Chapter 2: Hypothesis development 
 
From the preceding discussion on related literature, we can clearly observe a lack of focus on 
the relationship between firms’ governance ratings and their contemporaneous information 
asymmetry in capital markets. In our opinion, this is an important link that needs to be 
established and it is both imperative and crucial to understand the motivation of firms to get 
subscribed with commercial rating agencies. Since the firms pay a heavy fee to get rated, 
there must be some benefit that they seek to gain through their governance ratings. Basically, 
what is in it for firms to subscribe to these ratings? The answer simply lies in the very reason 
these commercial rating agencies came into existence; to increase the firms' credibility 
among investors. Therefore, firms pay to get rated and share their governance-related 
information willingly to reduce their information asymmetry and increase their credibility 
among investors. In order for this to be an incentive, firms expect ratings to be a positive 
signal for the market. Firms may also feel the need to be more transparent when a firm 
decides to launch its equity offering in the near future or if it perceives that its equity is 
under-valued. All of the above mentioned benefits for firms can be materialized only if there 
is a significant cross-sectional relationship between a firms’ corporate governance rating and 
their contemporaneous information asymmetry. More specifically, we believe that firms with 
high governance rating will have low contemporaneous information asymmetry. Since firms 
with better governance are more transparent, therefore their information asymmetry is less as 
compared to firms which are poorly governed. We also hypothesis that a firm with high 
governance quality should be associated with more transparency and low information 
asymmetry problems. Therefore, we expect the governance quality, measured by governance 




Hypothesis 1: There exists a significant cross-sectional relation between a firms’ governance 
rating and its information asymmetry. Specifically, we predict an inverse relation between 
firms’ governance quality, measured by governance ratings, and measures of information 
asymmetry.   
 
Theoretical literature on information asymmetry has established that more information is 
inversely proportional to information asymmetry and therefore, we hypothesize that as 
ratings information comes to the market, it will reduce information asymmetry level. For 
firms that get their governance-ratings for the first time, their information asymmetry level 
should reduce. Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows; 
 
Hypothesis 2: Initial ratings announcement should lead to reduced levels of information 
asymmetry in the post-announcement period. 
 
According to information asymmetry theory, capital markets react to any ‘new’ information. 
This reaction is well-reflected in security returns. Therefore, we hypothesize that if people 
react to information on governance ratings, then good rated firms should earn higher 
cumulative abnormal returns and firms with low ratings should be penalized in terms of low 
cumulative abnormal returns. This forms our third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: High-rated firms earn higher cumulative abnormal returns and low rated firms 
earn low or negative cumulative abnormal return around the first time when firms get their 
governance rating.  
 




Chapter 3: Data and summary statistics 
 
We use ratings data of two leading governance rating agencies; the GMI (Governance Metrics 
International) and ISS (International Shareholder Services). We use data for only U.S. firms for 
both rating agencies. The U.S. sample of GMI firms consists of all the firms that subscribed with 
GMI from December 2002 to February 2009. List of firms subscribed with GMI is obtained from 
their official website
2. The ratings data for GMI firms’ overall global ratings for the sample 
period are obtained from Bloomberg. Ratings data for GMI firms was only available for the 
overall global rating from August 2005 to February 2009, as this dataset was discontinued on 
Bloomberg from March 2009. Due to these limitations, our sample years for GMI are limited to 
2005 to 2009. For the ISS ratings, we also use Bloomberg as our source.  Ratings data for ISS 
was available on a monthly frequency as opposed to the quarterly frequency for GMI ratings data. 
The sample period for ISS ratings is from October 2005 through 2011 since Bloomberg’s dataset 
for ISS ratings starts from October 2005. We use two main scores from ISS; the overall index 
rating and the overall industry rating. For ISS sample firms, ISS rates all U.S. firms on the indices 
S&P 400, S&P 500, S&P 600 and Russell 3000. Therefore, ratings data used consist of all firms 
that were on their respective indices on a given date. To avoid missing observations, our sample 
consists of firms which remain a part of their respective indices from 2005 through 2011.  
 
For calculating information asymmetry proxies and controls, data is obtained through WRDS 
(Wharton Research Database Services). For both GMI and ISS, closing bid price, closing ask 
price, closing price, trading volume, and number of shares outstanding is obtained from CRSP 
Monthly Stock file. Data on analyst earning per share forecasts, actual earnings per share, and 
number of analyst data is obtained from I/B/E/S database. For calculating controls, data for total 




assets, total property, plant, and equipment, book price of stock, market price of stock, total 
number of shares outstanding, and operating income before depreciation is obtained from 
Compustat Fundamental North America file. To test the third hypothesis, Eventus
3
 (on WRDS) is 
used to run an event study for GMI firms with initial ratings available. 
Table I: Summary Statistics – GMI and ISS Ratings 
Panel A. Governance Metrics International (GMI) Rating  
Year N Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum N 
2005 1254 6.9880 1.4194 1.00 9.50 1254 
2006 3897 7.0547 1.4476 1.00 9.50 3897 
2007 5573 7.1092 1.4457 1.00 9.50 5573 
2008 5972 7.1168 1.5643 1.00 9.50 5972 
2009 1571 7.1048 1.6284 1.00 9.50 1571 
       
Panel B. International Shareholder Service (ISS) Index Rating 
Year N Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum N 
2005 7644 51.8489 28.4211 0.08 100.0 6276 
2006 30587 52.5841 28.1999 0.05 100.0 23999 
2007 20391 52.8661 28.5893 0.05 100.0 17127 
2008 20384 52.4111 28.4847 0.20 100.0 18228 
2009 17842 51.9290 28.6434 0.10 100.0 16918 
2010 22932 50.4259 27.6715 0.10 100.0 15488 
2011 22932 49.9125 27.5342 0.10 100.0 19375 
       
Panel C. International Shareholder Service (ISS) Industry Rating 
Year N Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum N 
2005 6276 60.8718 26.3140 0.3000 100.00 6276 
2006 23999 62.0600 25.9881 0.2500 100.00 23999 
2007 17127 63.1256 25.9296 0.2000 100.00 17127 
2008 18228 63.8902 25.4464 0.7000 100.00 18228 
2009 16918 63.7663 25.2389 0.9000 100.00 16918 
2010 15548 62.4388 24.6312 0.6000 100.00 15548 
2011 19375 62.6900 24.6432 0.6000 100.00 19375 
       





We also analyze summary statistics of ratings data which are presented in Table 1 above. Panel A 
describes the GMI ratings data. GMI rates companies on a scale of 1-10, as reflected in the 
minimum and maximum values. For GMI firms, the average rating, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation are almost the same across the sample period but the number of observations 
are different. This is due to the fact that our sample of GMI firms consists of firms which 
subscribed to GMI ratings from December 2002 to February 2009. If we consider the number of 
observations for 2006, it includes firms which subscribed from January 2006 to December 2006 
in addition to the observations for 2005. Another reason for this difference in the number of 
observations is limitations in data availability.  On Bloomberg, GMI ratings are available for only 
one quarter of the year 2005. Differences in number of observations for the years 2006, 2007, and 
2008 also arise as the number of firms subscribing or un-subscribing with GMI changes. The 
average rating for GMI firms is approximately 7, which is quite high. 
Panels B and C present summary statistics for ISS index rating and ISS industry ratings data. ISS 
rates companies on a percentile basis from 0 - 100. Ratings for index and industry scores for ISS 
have similar number of observations as the same sample was used. As for the number of 
observations in each sample year for ISS index and industry ratings, we see a huge difference 
from year to year. The difference in number of observations for different years in the sample 
period is due to the fact that ISS rates all companies on S&P 400, 500, and 600 and Russell 3000 
if they are on the index on a particular date. Therefore companies coming off the index will not 
have ratings anymore, and companies that remain on the index for consecutive years will remain 
a part of the sample. Other than that, firms on the index will have as many ratings as the number 
of times ISS rates companies. ISS ratings data is of monthly frequency with the exception of few 
months when ratings were not provided, especially in the later years of our sample period. The 
index ratings have a relatively low mean rating and higher standard deviation as compared to the 
16 
 
industry ratings. This is attributable to the nature of an index and industry rating scores. Index 
score is based on the percentile score assigned when comparison is based on an index, similarly, 
industry score is assigned on the basis of how a firm performed among its industry peers. Index 
constituents change often whereas industry participants do not get changed that often, therefore 
the standard deviation of ISS index ratings is higher than that of ISS industry rating. The mean 
ratings for ISS index score remains close to 50, but the mean rating for ISS industry score 
remains around 60 or even slightly above that. This is worth noticing as firms tend to get highly 
rated on average on industry score as compared to the index score. 
Having discussed the data collection and some characteristics of our ratings data, we now proceed 




Chapter 4: Description of Corporate Governance Ratings 
 
For the purpose of our research, understanding of the rating methodology used by GMI and ISS is 
crucial. Therefore we begin by explaining the methodology employed by rating agencies to 
calculate firm’s rating scores.  
 
ISS Corporate Governance Quotient metric was established in June 2002. ISS reports the 
governance scores in proxy voting reports for its client and these proxy analysis reports are 
widely disseminated and they find a way into public domain
4
. Firms are allowed to register with 
ISS to review the information used by ISS to calculate the score; however, the score is not 
revealed to the firms. Firms are also encouraged to input data on their own on ISS’s website. 
Among the U.S. firms, ISS rates entire indices such as; S&P 400, S&P 500, S&P 600, and 
Russell 3000. ISS provides its corporate governance quotient score on a relative percentile basis 
ranging from 0 to 100. The two main ‘raw’ scores are derived from 61 governance variables5 
which arise from eight core governance topics; (i) board structure and composition, (ii) charter 
and bylaw provisions, (iii) audit issues, (iv) anti-takeover practices, (v) executive and director 
compensation, (vi) progressive practices such as board performance review, (vii) director and 
officer stock ownership, and (viii) director’s education. The ‘raw’ scores from these categories 
are used to calculate two main scores and four sub-scores. The two main scores are CGQ_Index 
and CGQ_Industry, where CGQ refers to the corporate governance quotient. CGQ_Index is a 
percentile score that rates companies relative to other firms’ raw score that forms their respective 
index, whereas, CGQ_industry rates companies relative to the raw scores of firms in the same 
industry. Industry classification employed by ISS is the S&P 24 sector groupings, also known as 
GICS (Global Industry Classification Structure). These 24 sub groups are formed within ten 
                                                     
4 Drake (2002) 
5 For a detailed list of these 61 variables that form eight core topics, please refer to Appendix A.4, for extra details on 
ISS methodology, please refer to A.1 
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industry groupings by MSCI and S&P
6
. Each of the four sub scores is a quintile ranking provided 
by ISS to deal with different areas of governance which are the Board, Audit, Compensation/ 
Ownership, and Takeover Defenses. These sub-scores represents quintile rankings, therefore a 
firm with a score of 5 on any of the sub-score would mean that that company was among the 20% 
highest score firms. 
 
Governance Metrics International (GMI) was established in 2000. In 2010, it got merged with 
The Corporate Library and Audit Integrity to form ‘GMI Ratings’. GMI overall global rating is 
derived from 600 variables
7
, extracted from securities regulations, various codes of best practices, 
and exchange listing requirements. GMI generates a basic rating for all subscribed companies. 
The 600 variables are objectively structured to generate a yes, no, or undisclosed as possible 
answers. Information is gathered from public sources such as regulatory filings, company 
websites, news services, certain specialised websites and the Dow Jones Global Industry 
Classification System. The GMI rating methodology gathers information about a firm across 
seven categories; board accountability, financial disclosure and internal controls, executive 
compensation, market for control and ownership base, reputational and socially responsible 
investment issues, corporate behaviour, and shareholder’s rights. These categories are further 
divided into subsections and each individual metric is assigned a numerical value
8
. The collected 
data becomes an input for a relational database from where GMI sends the data entry reports to 
subscribed companies for a final accuracy check. The last step is to use company-adjusted data to 
run a propriety scoring model which calculates the ratings. The scoring model assigns ratings 
from 1 (lowest) to ten (highest). GMI scores are also assigned relatively. GMI ratings are relative 
to the entire GMI universe and also against other firms in the same country. A total of fourteen 
scores are assigned to each firm. For each of the seven categories discussed above, GMI assigns 
                                                     
6 For details of 24 sub groups and 10 major industries, please refer to Appendix A.3 
7 Drake (2002) 
8 For details on the subsections and variables for GMI that form each category, please refer to the Appendix A.2 
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two ratings; one is the global rating and second is a separate score for each category. Due to 






Chapter 5:  Research Design 
 
Now we turn to the research methodology employed in our paper. Hypothesis 1 states that a 
significant cross-sectional relationship exists between a firms’ corporate governance rating and its 
information asymmetry. We measure information asymmetry using six proxies; bid-ask spread, 
share turnover, number of analysts following, dispersion in analyst forecasts, forecast error, and 
normalized forecast error. Bid-ask spread is calculated simply by taking the difference between 
closing bid and ask for the preceding month. Share turnover is calculated by dividing the total 
trading volume by total number of outstanding shares for the preceding month as of the rating 
announcement date. Number of analysts is simply the number of analyst EPS (earning per share) 
forecasts available for the most recent quarter. Following Dorbetz et al. (2010), dispersion in 
analyst forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all EPS forecasts available for the most 
recent quarter. We take the logarithm (base 10) of dispersion. Forecast error is measured as the 
difference between actual EPS and average EPS forecast. We also take the absolute value of 
forecast error. Normalized forecast error, as the name implies is forecast error adjusted for 
volatility in earnings. Therefore we divide absolute forecast error by moving standard deviation 
of the past three years earning per share values. We also introduce four different controls. Firm 
size is shown to have a significant relationship with governance ratings as in Linden & Matolcsy 
(2004) and information asymmetry as in Hsueh & Liu (1992) and Dichev & Piotroski (2001). We 
use log of total assets as a measure of firm size. Firms with different financing needs might differ 
in terms of their willingness to share information, therefore we also use leverage ratio as a 
control. Leverage ratio is calculated as total long term liabilities to total market and book value. 
We also use tangibility as a control. Tangibility ratio is calculated by dividing total property, 
plant, and equipment value by total assets. We also introduce ROA (return on assets) as a control. 
Return on assets is calculated by dividing total operating income before depreciation by total 




To test our first hypothesis, each rating for each date is used as one data point. This means that if 
a GMI firm had four ratings for the year 2006, they will be treated as four different observations. 
We use a simple Ordinary Least Squares regression technique by using firms’ governance ratings 
as dependent variable and their contemporaneous information asymmetry proxies as independent 
variables. This procedure is done for all our ratings data, i.e., GMI overall global ratings, ISS 
index score, and ISS industry score. The regression model for the above regressions is as follows: 
 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(bdspread)t+ ȕ2(Shturnover)t+ ȕ3(dispersion)t+ ȕ4(Numanalyst)t + 
ȕ5(ferror)t+ȕ6(Normferror)t 
where: 
Ratingt – Rating at time t  
Bdspread – bid ask spread at time t, 
Shturnover – Share turnover at time t, 
Dispersion – dispersion in analysts’ forecasts at time t, 
Numanalyst – Number of analysts following a firm at time t 
Ferror – Forecast error in earnings per share at time t, and 
Normferror – Normalized forecast error at time t. 
 
Next, we use the same procedure along with controls to investigate if any of the control variables are 
affecting the cross-sectional relationship between firm’s governance ratings and their information 
asymmetry measures. The model below was used for all three ratings. The model used with controls is 
as follows:  
 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(bdspread)t+ ȕ2(Shturnover)t+ ȕ3(dispersion)t+ ȕ4(Numanalyst)t + 




Bdspread – bid ask spread at time t, 
Shturnover – Share turnover at time t, 
Dispersion – dispersion in analysts’ forecasts at time t, 
Numanalyst – Number of analysts following a firm at time t, 
Ferror – Forecast error in earnings per share at time t, 
Normferror – Normalized forecast error at time t, 
Firmsize – firm size measured by log of total assets at time t, 
Leverage – leverage ratio at time t, 
Tangibility – tangibility ratio at time t, and 
ROA – return on assets at time t. 
 
Next, in order to be sure that our results are not driven by any sub-period and/or year in our sample 
period, we also divide the ratings data by year and then run the regressions with information 
asymmetry proxies and controls. We use the same models discussed above. Since information for 
information asymmetry variables and controls are not available for the exact same day as the ratings 
announcement, we use data for the most recent month (for bid ask spread and share turnover) and the 
most recent quarter (for number of analyst, dispersion in analyst forecasts, forecast errors, and 
normalized forecast errors) as contemporaneous data.  
To further check for robustness of our results, we also perform OLS regressions using the three 
commercial governance ratings by splitting them by each year as dependent variable and each 
information asymmetry as independent variable along with controls. For this purpose, we use the 
following models: 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(bdspread)t+ Ȗ1(firmsize)t + Ȗ2(leverage)t + Ȗ3(tangibility)t + Ȗ4(ROA)t 
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Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(Shturnover)t+ Ȗ1(firmsize)t + Ȗ2(leverage)t + Ȗ3(tangibility)t + Ȗ4(ROA)t 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(dispersion)t + Ȗ1(firmsize)t + Ȗ2(leverage)t + Ȗ3(tangibility)t + Ȗ4(ROA)t 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(Numanalyst)t + Ȗ1(firmsize)t + Ȗ2(leverage)t + Ȗ3(tangibility)t + Ȗ4(ROA)t 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(ferror)t + Ȗ1(firmsize)t + Ȗ2(leverage)t + Ȗ3(tangibility)t + Ȗ4(ROA)t 
Ratingt = α+ ȕ1(Normferror)t+ Ȗ1(firmsize)t + Ȗ2(leverage)t + Ȗ3(tangibility)t + Ȗ4(ROA)t 
 
In order to test the second hypothesis, we use the same sub-sample with GMI firms that received 
their first rating. Due to data limitations, the subscription dates for firms is only known for GMI 
sample. In this way, we know for sure that the rating right after a firm gets rated is the initial rating 
for that firm. In order to test if information asymmetry reduced after the first governance rating 
announcement, we use this sample and for all event dates, we calculate the pre- and post- 
information asymmetry measures; bid-ask spread, share turnover, dispersion in analyst forecasts, 
forecast error, and normalized forecast error. We average the change in information asymmetry level 
for the entire sample and test for their significance. We also divide the sample into three terciles 
based on ratings and then repeat the analysis. We do not use number of analyst as a proxy for 
information asymmetry for this analysis as the number of analyst do not change from quarter to 
quarter when ‘new’ information like governance ratings comes to the market.   
We test the third hypothesis by employing the event study methodology. In order to observe how the 
market reacts to ratings announcement, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns in the pre- post- 
and around- announcement windows; (-20, -5), (-5, -2), (-2, 0), (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 2), (-5, 5), (0, 1), 
(0, 2), (2, 5), and (5, 20). We also divide the initial rating firms into terciles on the basis of rating and 
then repeat the analysis. The three terciles formed were; (i) low-rated (1 ≤ rating < 4), (ii) moderately 





Chapter 6: Empirical results 
A. Cross-sectional relationship between governance ratings and firms’ contemporaneous 
information asymmetry 
To examine the cross-sectional relationship between governance ratings and information 
asymmetry, we employ three different ratings (GMI global rating, ISS index score, and ISS 
industry score), six information asymmetry proxies (bid ask spread, share turnover, number of 
analysts, dispersion in analyst forecast, forecast error, and normalized forecast error), and four 
controls (firm size, tangibility, leverage, and profitability). We present and analyse the results for 
all three governance ratings separately. Results for regressions with all ratings data points as 
dependent and information asymmetry proxies as independent variables for GMI overall global 
ratings are presented in table II on page 25. Results for similar regressions with controls are 
presented in table III on page 26.  
For GMI ratings in table II, results show that bid-ask spread, share turnover, number of analyst, 
forecast error, and normalized forecast error are all significant at 1% but dispersion in analyst 
forecast is significant at 10%. This supports our hypothesis 1. However the signs indicate that 
firms with low bid-ask spreads (low IA – information asymmetry), low share turnover ratio (high 
IA), high dispersion in analyst forecast (high IA), low normalized forecast errors (low IA), high 
forecast errors (high IA), and high number of analyst (low IA) have better governance ratings. 
Thus, we see that the results for the direction of this significant cross-sectional relationship are 
mixed. The positive sign on forecast errors justifies our use of normalized forecast errors as it is 
not intuitively appealing that firms with high forecast errors (high information asymmetry) are 
more likely to get higher rating. All other proxies, apart from high forecast error and low share 
turnover supports that a negative and significant cross-sectional relationship exists between GMI 
global ratings and their contemporaneous information asymmetry. Therefore, for GMI ratings, we 
25 
 
conclude support for hypothesis 1 and a negative relationship, that is, firms with high governance 
rating have low information asymmetry. 
TABLE II: Pooled regression: GMI Firms Ratings & Information Asymmetry 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions using GMI overall global ratings as dependent variable for the 
sample period Aug 2005 –Feb 2009. All information asymmetry proxies are used as independent variables. Information 
asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between closing bid and 
closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the 
most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the total number of 
analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard 
deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between 
actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast 
error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. Each number in the 
parameter estimate column are reported with their respective t-values in a separate column. Finally, asterisks (***) 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 6.90075*** 0.02863 241.00 <.0001 
Bid ask spread -0.02920** 0.01149 -2.54 0.0110 
Share turnover -0.25670*** 0.03396 -7.56 <.0001 
Dispersion 0.9283* 0.01783 -1.82 0.0690 
Number of analyst 0.00553*** 0.00018 31.12 <.0001 
Forecast error 0.04225*** 0.01093 3.86 0.0001 
Normalized forecast error 
 









         
0.0001 





TABLE III: Pooled regression: GMI Firms Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions using GMI overall global ratings as dependent variable for the 
sample period Aug 2005 –Feb 2009. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask 
spread as the difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover 
ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) 
Number of analyst is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) 
Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last 
quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per 
share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms 
quarterly earnings during the last three years. The controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) 
tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets (Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage 
ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets 
calculated by operating income before depreciation to net assets of a firm. Each number in the parameter estimate 
column are reported with their respective t-values in a separate column. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 2.75782*** 0.11846 23.28 <.0001 
Bid ask spread -0.02071* 0.01189 -1.74 0.0814 
Share turnover 0.03337 0.03819 0.87 0.3822 
Dispersion 0.7127*** 0.02048 7.18 <.0001 
Number analyst 0.00211*** 0.00021853 9.67 <.0001 
Forecast error 0.03069** 0.01385 2.22 0.0267 
Normalized forecast error -0.00103* 0.00038055 -2.72 0.0066 
Firm size 2.6650*** 0.01203 35.39 <.0001 
Leverage ratio 0.00209 0.00256 0.82 0.4142 
Tangibility ratio 0.00806 0.02995 0.27 0.7879 
ROA 
 










   <0.0001 
0.24371 6.15 <.0001 
 
When we look at the results of regressions when controls are introduced in table III, it becomes 
clear that the cross-sectional relationship between GMI ratings and their contemporaneous 
information asymmetry are not affected by leverage and tangibility of a firm. However, firm size 
and profitability (ROA) are positively related to ratings. When controls are introduced, some 
proxies change signs too like share turnover, which had a negative sign in the last regression 
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becomes positive. Therefore, we can confidently state that even when we controls for firm size, 
leverage, tangibility, and profitability, we find strong support for hypothesis 1. Firm size  
(measured by log of total assets) and firm’s profitability (measured as return on assets) have a 
positive relationship with ratings, that is, bigger firms with high profitability tend to have high 
governance scores on GMI governance ratings. Regression results for ISS index rating with 
information asymmetry variables and with information asymmetry proxies and controls are 
presented in tables IV and V respectively.  
Pooled regressions for ISS index ratings (results presented on page 28) show that higher rating on 
ISS index main score is associated with high bid-ask (high IA), higher share turnover (low IA), 
higher dispersion in analyst forecast (high IA), lower number of analyst (high IA) and lower 
normalized forecast error (low IA). Forecast error yields non-significant results. From these 
results, we can draw support for hypothesis 1 for sure as most of the proxies are significant. 
However, if we consider the direction of this relationship, we observe a positive and significant 
relationship between firms’ ISS index ratings and their contemporaneous information asymmetry 
measures. This implies that firms with high information asymmetry willingly share their 
governance-related information with the market to reduce their information asymmetry in the 
future. Since high information asymmetry is usually associated with smaller firms, our results for 
ISS index score might be driven by the higher number of small firms in our sample. As 
previously discussed, ISS firms sample combines firms from S&P 400-, 500-, 600-, and Russell 







TABLE IV: Pooled regression: ISS Index Ratings & Information Asymmetry 
 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions using ISS index ratings as dependent variable for the sample 
period Aug 2005 –Feb 2009. All information asymmetry proxies are used as independent variables. Information 
asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between closing bid and 
closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the 
most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the total number of 
analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard 
deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between 
actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast 
error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. Each number in the 
parameter estimate column are reported with their respective t-values in a separate column. Finally, asterisks (***) 

















Bid ask spread 12.78963*** 0.85439 14.97 <.0001 
Share turnover 3.40695*** 0.37249 9.15 <.0001 
Dispersion 486.855*** 0.20993 13.19 <.0001 
Number of analyst -0.03664*** 0.00230 -15.91 <.0001 
Forecast error -0.00120 0.01539 -0.08 0.9378 
Normalized forecast error 
 











0.00333 -2.23 0.0256 





TABLE V: Pooled regression: ISS Index Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions using ISS index ratings as dependent variable for the sample 
period Aug 2005 –Feb 2009. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread 
as the difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the 
ratio of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of 
analyst is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst 
forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst 
forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) 
Normalized forecast error is forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the 
last three years. The controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total 
tangible assets (Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage ratio calculated as total long term 
liability divided by total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets calculated by operating income 
before depreciation to net assets of a firm. Each number in the parameter estimate column are reported with their 
respective t-values in a separate column. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 34.62094*** 1.47713 23.44 <.0001 
Bid ask spread 12.97578*** 1.02713 12.63 <.0001 
Share turnover 1.85565*** 0.45384 4.09 <.0001 
Dispersion 2.7336 0.27214 1.60 0.1085 
Number analyst -0.05075*** 0.00318 -15.94 <.0001 
Forecast error 1.35150*** 0.18817 7.18 <.0001 
Normalized forecast error -0.01702*** 0.00392 -4.34 <.0001 
Firm size 110.71*** 0.15848 12.90 <.0001 
Leverage ratio 0.00034*** 0.00005261 6.62 <.0001 
Tangibility ratio 1.94421*** 0.43784 4.44 <.0001 
ROA 
 














0.76170 -4.72 <.0001 
 
When controls are used in addition to information asymmetry variables for ISS index ratings 
regressions (results are reported above), dispersion in analyst earnings forecast becomes 
insignificant, while forecast error becomes positive and significant and all controls are significant. 
Firm size, tangibility ratio, and leverage ratio are positively significant but ROA is negatively 
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significant. Results show that all of the controls introduced are affecting the relationship between 
ISS index ratings and their contemporaneous information asymmetry measures. Therefore, firms 
with larger asset base, more tangible assets, higher leverage ratios, and low return on assets seem 
to have high rating on ISS index ratings. Forecast error is positively significant as opposed to 
negatively significant normalized forecast error. From this analysis, we can draw support for 
hypothesis 1, as most of the information asymmetry proxies are significant with their signs in 
place even after controls are introduced. 
Regression results when using ISS industry ratings with information asymmetry proxies and 
controls are presented in tables VI (on page 31) and VII (on page 32). These regressions also 
serve the purpose of controlling for firms in different industries and if that could affect the cross-
sectional relationship between ISS governance rating and information asymmetry. Results show 
that firms with high industry rating have higher bid-ask (high IA), high share turnover (low IA), 
high dispersion in analyst forecasts (high IA), high number of analyst following (low IA), and 
high forecast errors (high IA). Normalized forecast errors are insignificant. The results support 
hypothesis 1 but nothing can be concluded about the direction of this relationship
9
. When controls 
are introduced, normalized forecast errors become negatively significant at 1%. All control 
variables (table VII) are positively significant except tangibility. The parameter estimate on 
leverage ratio is very small and significant which implies that high leverage firms have higher 
ratings. Therefore, we can conclude support for hypothesis 1 even when controlled for firm size, 





                                                     
9 The analysis was repeated for each rating date and also by taking the average of monthly ratings in a quarter (for ISS). 
The results are consistent with the ones presented in this paper.  
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TABLE VI: Pooled regression: ISS Industry Ratings & Information Asymmetry 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions using ISS industry ratings as dependent variable for the 
sample period Aug 2005 –Feb 2009. All information asymmetry proxies are used as independent variables. Information 
asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between closing bid and 
closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the 
most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the total number of 
analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard 
deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between 
actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast 
error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. Each number in the 
parameter estimate column are reported with their respective t-values in a separate column. Finally, asterisks (***) 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 56.16799*** 0.27966 200.84 <.0001 
Bid ask spread 17.88044*** 0.72231 24.75 <.0001 
Share turnover 3.44108*** 0.31321 10.99 <.0001 
Dispersion 0.3836** 0.17553 2.17 0.0300 
Number of analyst 0.17576*** 0.00198 88.82 <.0001 
Forecast error 0.04016** 0.01308 3.07 0.0021 
Normalized forecast error 
 










0.00277 1.30 0.1923 












TABLE VII: Pooled regression: ISS Industry Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions using ISS industry ratings as dependent variable for the 
sample period Aug 2005 –Feb 2009. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask 
spread as the difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover 
ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) 
Number of analyst is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) 
Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last 
quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per 
share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms 
quarterly earnings during the last three years. The controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) 
tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets (Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage 
ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets 
calculated by operating income before depreciation to net assets of a firm. Each number in the parameter estimate 
column are reported with their respective t-values in a separate column. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance 







Pr > |t| 
Intercept -36.92758*** 1.19408 -30.93 <.0001 
Bid ask spread 15.11294*** 0.82374 18.35 <.0001 
Share turnover 4.27846*** 0.36439 11.74 <.0001 
Dispersion 0.0039*** 0.21806 11.05 <.0001 
Number analyst 0.08439*** 0.00261 32.36 <.0001 
Forecast error 0.72259*** 0.14378 5.03 <.0001 
Normalized forecast error -0.01172** 0.00312 -3.76 0.0002 
Firm size 31433*** 0.12805 81.98 <.0001 
Leverage ratio 0.00025*** 0.00004240 6.05 <.0001 
Tangibility ratio -12.98734*** 0.35374 -36.71 <.0001 
ROA 
 















B. Cross-sectional relationship between governance ratings and information asymmetry by 
year 
Ratings in each year of the sample period (GMI 2005-2009 and ISS 2005-2011) are grouped 
together and regressed against all contemporaneous information asymmetry proxies. As discussed 
in the methodology section, this is done as a robustness check to see if the results in the main 
regressions are robust to division of the sample by year and that the results are not driven by a 
single year or a sub-sample. Therefore, we run the same regression model as used for above 
regressions for all three ratings (GMI overall global rating, ISS index rating, and ISS industry 
rating) for each year in their respective sample period. The results for GMI ratings with all 
information asymmetry proxies are presented in table VIII (on page 34) and those with 
information asymmetry proxies and controls are presented in table IX (on page 35). Results show 
that only two of the proxies, share turnover and number of analyst, are significant for all the 
years, therefore, we conclude only weak support for hypothesis 1. Share turnover is consistently 
negative (high IA) and number of analyst is positive (low IA). When controls are introduced to 
the same regression along with other information asymmetry proxies, share turnover proxy is not 
significant for most of the sample period, however, number of analyst proxy remains significant 
from 2006 through 2009. Among the controls, firm size and return on asset shows positive 
significant relationship with GMI ratings. From this analysis, we can conclude that large firms 
with high profitability (ROA) ratios, and high number of analyst following are more likely to get 
highly rated by GMI. Therefore, when ratings data is divided by year and controls are introduced, 







Table VIII: Cross-sectional Relationship: GMI Ratings & Information Asymmetry 
The following table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions with GMI governance ratings as dependent 
variable and all information asymmetry measures as independent variables in each regression. The results are grouped 
by year (as shown by separate columns), i.e. in each regression, ratings of all firms are used for that respective year. 
The regression model uses rating value as dependent variable and different information asymmetry proxies as 
independent variable. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the 
difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio 
of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst 
is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst 
forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (v) Analyst forecast error is the 
difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast 
error is the forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. 
Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses represent their 
respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 5%, and (*) 
represents significance at 10%.  
 Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
      










      











      












      










      










      










      
Number of observations 925 3204 6645 10122 4285 
      
R2 0.0192 0.0302 0.0182 0.0167 0.0105 
Adjusted R2  0.0128 0.0284 0.0173 0.0162 0.0091 






Table IX: Cross-sectional Relationship: GMI Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions with GMI governance ratings as dependent variable and all 
information asymmetry measures and four controls as independent variables in each regression. The results are grouped 
by year (as shown by separate columns), i.e. in each regression, ratings of all firms are used for that respective year. 
The regression model uses rating value as dependent variable and different information asymmetry proxies as 
independent variable. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the 
difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio 
of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst 
is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst 
forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (v) Analyst forecast error is the 
difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast 
error is the forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. 
The controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets 
(Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by 
total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets calculated by operating income before depreciation to 
net assets of a firm. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses 
represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 
5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%.  
 Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
      













































































































      
      
Number of observations 814 3362 5012 7730 2462 
      
R2 0.0663 0.0389 0.0436 0.0402 0.0417 
Adjusted R2  0.0547 0.0360 0.0417 0.0389 0.0378 
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Yearly regressions for ISS index ratings against information asymmetry proxies (presented in 
table X on page 37), show that bid ask spread is positively significant (high IA) at 1 % level for 
all the years. Share turnover is also significant for 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2011. However, it 
changes sign from negative in 2005 and 2006 to positive from 2009 through 2011. Dispersion in 
analyst forecast is also significant and positive (high IA) for the whole sample, that is from 2005 
through 2011. Number of analyst is negatively significant (high IA) for the period from 2008 
through 2011. Normalized forecast error also shows negatively significant (low IA) for the years 
2008 through 2010. This means that at least for the period from 2008 - 2011, higher bid-ask 
spreads (high IA), higher share turnover (low IA), high dispersion in analyst forecast (high IA), 
low number of analysts (high IA), and low normalized forecast errors (high IA) are related to 
high ISS index ratings. Different information asymmetry proxies point to different directions in 
terms of the relationship, therefore, no definite conclusion can be reached about the direction but 
we can conclude that there exists substantial evidence for the relationship between ISS index 
ratings and information asymmetry proxies. Thus we find support for hypothesis I. When controls 
are introduced (results in table XI on page 38), share turnover changes sign, dispersion and the 
number of analyst proxy do not change sign. As for controls, tangibility and leverage are 
insignificant for most of the sample period but firm size has positive and ROA has negative 
relationship with ratings. Therefore, we can conclude evidence for hypothesis 1 even when 









Table X: ISS Cross-sectional Relationship: ISS Index Ratings & Information Asymmetry 
The following table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions with ISS governance index ratings as 
dependent variable and all information asymmetry measures as independent variables in each regression. The results 
are grouped by year (as shown by separate columns), i.e. in each regression, ratings of all firms are used for that 
respective year. The regression model uses rating value as dependent variable and different information asymmetry 
proxies as independent variable. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask 
spread as the difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover 
ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) 
Number of analyst is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) 
Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (v) Analyst 
forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) 
Normalized forecast error is the forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during 
the last three years. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses 
represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 
5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%.  
 Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        





























































































        
Number of 
observations 
123 19822 14505 15362 14181 18756 19281 
        
R2 0.1896 0.0017 0.0010 0.0033 0.0095 0.0132 0.0109 
Adjusted R2  0.1477 0.0014 0.0006 0.0030 0.0091 0.0129 0.0106 
P-value 0.0004 <0.0001 0.0272 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 




Table XI: Cross-sectional Relationship: ISS Index Ratings & Information Asymmetry & Controls 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions with ISS governance index ratings as dependent variable and 
all information asymmetry measures and four controls as independent variables. The results are grouped by year (as 
shown by separate columns), i.e. in each regression, ratings of all firms are used for that respective year. The regression 
model uses rating value as dependent variable and different information asymmetry proxies as independent variable. 
Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between 
closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading 
volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the 
total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is 
calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference 
between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is 
the forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. The 
controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets 
(Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by 
total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets calculated by operating income before depreciation to 
net assets of a firm. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses 
represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 
5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%.  
 Year 







































































































































































93 14075 10296 11038 10234 13452 14098 
        
R2 0.3611 0.0058 0.0201 0.0113 0.0087 0.0155 0.0090 
Adjusted R2  0.2832 0.0051 0.0191 0.0104 0.0077 0.0147 0.0083 
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Overall industry ratings from ISS are grouped by year and regressed against their 
contemporaneous information asymmetry proxies and controls. Their results are presented in 
tables XII and XIII on page 40 and 41 respectively. Controls are also introduced to the same 
regressions and results are presented in table XI. We can see that significant relationships are 
observed for bid ask spread, share turnover, number of analysts, dispersion in analyst forecast for 
all years and with forecast error and normalized error for most of the sample years. Therefore, we 
conclude strong support for hypothesis 1. Bid ask spread has a consistent positive sign. Share 
turnover changes sign form negative in the initial sample years to positive in the later part of our 
sample period. Results for number of analyst, forecast error, and normalized forecast error show 
positive significance for most of the years in which they are significant. Therefore, no 
determination of direction of the cross-sectional relationship is possible. When controls are 
introduced for these yearly regressions with information asymmetry proxies, the results are 
consistent with those without controls. Among the controls, firm size is positively related to the 
ratings and leverage ratio is negatively related to ISS industry ratings. This implies that bigger 
firms with less leverage ratios receive higher overall industry rating by ISS for almost all of the 




Table XII: ISS Cross-sectional Relationship: ISS Industry Ratings & Information Asymmetry 
The following table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions with ISS governance industry ratings as 
dependent variable and all information asymmetry measures as independent variables in each regression. The results 
are grouped by year (as shown by separate columns), i.e. in each regression, ratings of all firms are used for that 
respective year. The regression model uses rating value as dependent variable and different information asymmetry 
proxies as independent variable. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask 
spread as the difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover 
ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) 
Number of analyst is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) 
Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (v) Analyst 
forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) 
Normalized forecast error is the forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during 
the last three years. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses 
represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 
5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%. 
                                                                   Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 





























































































        
Number of 
observations 
123 19822 14505 15632 14181 18756 19281 
        
R2 0.1770 0.0645 0.0699 0.0517 0.0678 0.0087 0.0296 
Adjusted R2  0.1344 0.0642 0.0695 0.0513 0.0674 0.0084 0.0293 
P-value 0.0008 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 





Table XIII: Cross-sectional Relationship: ISS Industry Ratings & Information Asymmetry & 
Controls 
The following table presents results for OLS regressions with ISS governance industry ratings as dependent variable 
and all information asymmetry measures and four controls as independent variables. The results are grouped by year 
(as shown by separate columns), i.e. in each regression, ratings of all firms are used for that respective year. The 
regression model uses rating value as dependent variable and different information asymmetry proxies as independent 
variable. Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference 
between closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total 
trading volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is 
simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast 
is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference 
between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is 
the forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. The 
controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets 
(Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by 
total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets calculated by operating income before depreciation to 
net assets of a firm. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses 
represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 
5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%. 
 Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
        



























































































































































93 14075 10296 11038 10234 13452 14098 
R2 0.4498 0.1231 0.1784 0.1360 0.1206 0.0173 0.0540 
Adjusted R2  0.3827 0.1225 0.1776 0.1352 0.1198 0.0166 0.0533 




C. Cross-sectional relationship between governance ratings and information asymmetry by each 
proxy 
To further investigate the cross-sectional relationship, we also run yearly regressions with each 
governance rating observation against each information asymmetry proxy with all four controls. 
This procedure is repeated for all three ratings; GMI rating, ISS index rating, and ISS industry 
rating. Controls are used as independent variables along with each information asymmetry 
variable in all regressions. Results for GMI overall global ratings are presented in table XIV (on 
page 44). It can be easily observed that none of the information asymmetry proxies were 
significant for the sample period except number of analysts. However, among the controls, firm 
size remained significant throughout the sample period 2005 -2009 and return on assets remained 
significant at 1% for 2006, 2007, and 2008. All of the regressions had a very low p-value showing 
that their regression results were valid and that no significant relationship holds between GMI 
governance ratings and information asymmetry proxies. These results show that firms with high 
GMI rating were followed by a larger number of analysts, and that they were larger and more 
profitable firms. These results are not consistent with our previous findings and we observe that 
our hypothesis 1 does not hold under this analysis.   
When ISS index ratings are used as dependent variable, the results (presented in table XV on 
page 46) show a significant relationship between ISS index ratings and most of information 
asymmetry proxies for most of the sample period (2005 – 2011). For ISS index ratings, bid-ask 
spread, share turnover, number of analyst, and dispersion in analyst forecasts show a significant 
relationship with ISS index ratings for most or the entire sample period. Forecast error and 
normalized forecast error are not significant for most of the years. However, the sign of parameter 
estimates change often. Among the controls, firm size and return on assets show significance for 
most of the years. However, no definite direction for this relationship can be concluded as the 
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controls, firm size and return on assets change sign. Therefore, our results are consistent with the 
previous results for ISS index ratings. 
When we use ISS industry ratings, results (table XVI on page 48) show significant relationship 
with bid-ask spread, share turnover, number of analyst following, and dispersion in analyst 
forecasts. Results show a positive significant bid-ask spread, positive dispersion in analysts 
forecast, and positive number of analyst variable. Other proxies; forecast error and share turnover 
change signs during the sample period, therefore no absolute direction of relationship can be 
concluded. Among the controls, firm size, tangibility, and return on assets show significant 
relationships with ISS industry ratings for almost all of the years. A key point to note is that 
tangibility ratio is highly negatively significant for all the years. This shows that firms that had 
more tangible assets like property plant and equipment were the ones with low ISS industry 
rating, i.e. poor governance. Firm size is highly significant and positive for all the sample years. 
Return on assets is mostly significant with a positive sign. This implies that large players from 
each industry with higher firm size, higher profits, and low tangible assets score high on 
governance. From the above analysis, we see that the results for ISS industry ratings are 
consistent with the past results and there is evidence to support hypothesis 1 but determination of 
direction was not possible given the frequent changes in sign on parameter estimates of 










Table XIV: GMI Governance Index Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
The following table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions with GMI ratings as dependent variable and 
each information asymmetry proxy with four controls. The results are grouped by year (as shown by separate columns), 
i.e. in each regression, multiple ratings for the same firm are used for that respective year. Information asymmetry 
proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between closing bid and closing ask 
for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the most recent 
month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the total number of analysts 
following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard 
deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between 
actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast 
error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. The controls 
introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets (Property, Plant, 
and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by total market and 
book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets calculated by operating income before depreciation to net assets of a 
firm. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses represent their 
respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 5%, and (*) 




 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A               
 
     


















































No. of observations 826 3405 7350 7824 2027 
R2 0.0651 0.0388 0.0395 0.0341 0.0334 
Adj R2 0.0594 0.0374 0.0389 0.0335 0.0310 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
      
Panel B 
 
     


















































No. of observations 826 3405 7350 7824 2027 
R2 0.0600 0.0392 0.0396 0.0340 0.0341 
Adj R2 0.0543 0.0378 0.0389 0.0334 0.0317 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
      
Panel C 
 
     










    Firms size 2.7079*** 2.4405*** 1.1009*** 2.1644*** 2.1439*** 
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(5.64) (9.65) (9.98) (8.05) (4.14) 






























No. of observations 817 3371 3479 3734 984 
R2 0.0594 0.0412 0.0423 0.0338 0.0332 
Adj R2 0.0536 0.0398 0.0409 0.0325 0.0283 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
      
Panel D 
 
     


















































No. of observations 817 3371 3479 3734 984 
R2 0.0591 0.0393 0.0435 0.0304 0.0299 
Adj R2 0.0533 0.0378 0.0422 0.0291 0.0250 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
      
Panel E 
 
     


















































No. of observations 815 3403 3518 3757 993 
R2 0.0600 0.0403 0.0402 0.0322 0.0282 
Adj R2 0.0542 0.0389 0.0389 0.0309 0.0233 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
      
Panel F 
 
     


















































No. of observations 823 3397 3511 3840 1484 
R2 0.0623 0.0387 0.0415 0.0312 0.0411 
Adj R2 0.0565 0.0373 0.0402 0.0299 0.0379 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Table XV: ISS Governance Index Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
The following table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions with ISS index ratings as dependent variable and 
each information asymmetry proxy with four controls. The results are grouped by year (as shown by separate columns), i.e. 
in each regression, multiple ratings for the same firm are used for that respective year. Information asymmetry proxies are 
calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between closing bid and closing ask for the most 
recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading volume during the most recent month available 
to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the total number of analysts following a  company as of 
most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings 
forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share value and 
average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized forecast error is forecast error divided by average earnings 
volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. The controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total 
assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible assets (Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) 
leverage ratio calculated as total long term liability divided by total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on 
assets calculated by operating income before depreciation to net assets of a firm. Each number without parenthesis 
represents the parameter estimate and the numbers in parentheses represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) 
represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%.  
 Year 




       






































































No. of observations 18910 15733 11477 11965 10843 14023 14471 
R2 0.0055 0.0032 0.0121 0.0045 0.0043 0.0082 0.0026 
Adj R2 0.0052 0.0029 0.0116 0.0041 0.0038 0.0078 0.0023 




       






































































No. of observations 18910 15733 11477 11965 10843 14023 14471 
R2 0.0069 0.0056 0.0111 0.0047 0.0011 0.0074 0.0010 
Adj R2 0.0067 0.0053 0.0107 0.0043 0.0006 0.0070 0.0006 
p- value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0403 <0.0001 0.0146 
Panel C 
 
       




























    Tangibility ratio 4.56** -0.578 -1.023 1.84 0.067 1.6 0.77 
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(1.89) (-0.51) (-0.77) (1.48) (0.06) (1.38) (0.72) 




























No. of observations 3362 14535 10573 11169 10390 13586 14107 
R2 0.0072 0.0049 0.0144 0.0092 0.0034 0.0095 0.0017 
Adj R2 0.0058 0.0045 0.0139 0.0088 0.0029 0.0091 0.0013 
p- value 0.0002 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0003 
 
Panel D 
       
        








































































No. of observations 3362 14535 10573 11169 10390 13586 14107 
R2 0.0064 0.0049 0.0156 0.0056 0.0035 0.0104 0.0018 
Adj R2 0.0049 0.0045 0.0151 0.0052 0.0030 0.0101 0.0015 
p- value 0.0007 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Panel E 
       
        






































































No. of observations 3385 14664 10736 11299 10504 13691 14247 
R2 0.0063 0.0040 0.0108 0.0049 0.0027 0.0072 0.0006 
Adj R2 0.0048 0.0037 0.0104 0.0044 0.0022 0.0069 0.0002 
p- value 0.0007 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1378 
 
Panel F 
       









































































        
No. of observations 96 14284 10487 11171 10366 13637 14310 
R2 0.0973 0.0040 0.0093 0.0040 0.0030 0.0081 0.0005 
Adj R2 0.0471 0.0036 0.0088 0.0035 0.0025 0.0077 0.0001 
p- value 0.0955 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.229 
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Table XVI: ISS Governance Industry Ratings & Information Asymmetry with Controls 
The following table presents results for ordinary least squares regressions with ISS industry ratings as dependent 
variable and each information asymmetry proxy with four controls. The results are grouped by year (as shown by 
separate columns), i.e. in each regression, multiple ratings for the same firm are used for that respective year. 
Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between 
closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading 
volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Number of analyst is simple the 
total number of analysts following a  company as of most recent quarter, (iv) Dispersion in analyst forecast is 
calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts during the last quarter, (v) Analyst forecast error 
is the difference between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (vi) Normalized 
forecast error is forecast error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three 
years. The controls introduced are; (i) firm size as log of total assets, (ii) tangibility ratio calculated by total tangible 
assets (Property, Plant, and equipment) to total firm assets, (iii) leverage ratio calculated as total long term liability 
divided by total market and book value of a firm, and (iv) Return on assets calculated by operating income before 
depreciation to net assets of a firm. Each number without parenthesis represents the parameter estimate and the 
numbers in parentheses represent their respective t-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) 
represents significance at 5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%. 
 Year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Panel A 
 
       







































































No. of observations 18910 15733 11477 11965 10843 14023 14471 
R2 0.0833 0.0816 0.1551 0.1285 0.1152 0.0146 0.0450 
Adj R2 0.0830 0.0814 0.1548 0.1282 0.1148 0.0142 0.0446 
p-value <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.0001 
Panel B 
 
       







































































No. of observations 18910 15733 11477 11965 10843 14023 14471 
R2 0.0831 0.0817 0.1586 0.1358 0.1212 0.0156 0.0434 
Adj R2 0.0829 0.0815 0.1582 0.1354 0.1208 0.0152 0.0430 
p-value <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001 <0.0001 
        
Panel C 
 
       














    Firms size 40200*** 60400*** 6x10
6*** 1x105*** 239*** 1502*** 0.06*** 
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(14.17) (28.81) (29.63) (27.20) (21.32) (6.76) (13.78) 










































No. of observations 3362 14535 10573 11169 10390 13586 14107 
R2 0.1242 0.1236 0.1687 0.1327 0.122 0.0156 0.0500 
Adj R2 0.1229 0.1233 0.1683 0.1323 0.1215 0.0152 0.0497 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
        
Panel D 
 
       









































































No. of observations 3362 14535 10573 11169 10390 13586 14107 
R2 0.1115 0.1080 0.1543 0.1210 0.1050 0.0129 0.0437 
Adj R2 0.1101 0.1077 0.1539 0.1206 0.1045 0.0125 0.0434 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
        
Panel E 
 
       







































































No. of observations 3385 14664 10736 11299 10504 13691 14247 
R2 0.1046 0.1073 0.1486 0.1198 0.1036 0.0129 0.0441 
Adj R2 0.1033 0.1070 0.1482 0.1194 0.1032 0.0125 0.0438 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
        
Panel F 
 









































































No. of observations 96 14284 10487 11171 10366 13637 14310 
R2 0.0379 0.1040 0.1467 0.1156 0.0969 0.0123 0.0444 
Adj R2 -0.0155 0.1037 0.1463 0.1152 0.0964 0.0120 0.0441 




D. Change in information asymmetry level around initial ratings announcement: 
In order to test hypothesis 2, we use data for only GMI firms as initial ratings announcement 
dates are available for GMI only. Table XVII presents (on page 52) the results for change in 
information asymmetry level for these firms. We can observe that none of the mean differences in 
pre- and post- information asymmetry levels is significant except dispersion (at 10% level) when 
we do the analysis for the whole sample of firms with initial ratings data. This implies that the 
average difference in dispersion in analyst forecast is significant and therefore information 
asymmetry in the post-announcement period is lower than that in pre-announcement period. To 
make the analysis more meaningful, we repeat the analysis by dividing initial rating firms into 
terciles according to their rating. The three terciles formed are; (i) tercile 1 (1 ≤ rating < 4), (ii) 
tercile β (4 ≤ rating < 7), and (iii) tercile γ (7 ≤ rating ≤ 10). All three terciles show insignificant 
results, therefore we conclude that the results provide no support for our second hypothesis and 
therefore when GMI firms get rated for the first time, no significant impact is observed on their 
information asymmetry level. 
E. Market’s reaction to initial ratings announcement  
To test our third hypothesis, we use a sub-sample of GMI firms for which initial ratings data is 
available. We capture the market’s reaction to ratings announcements through firms’ cumulative 
abnormal returns. We observe the effect of initial ratings announcement on cumulative abnormal 
returns in the pre-, post-, and around- announcement windows; (-20, -5), (-5, -2), (-2, 0), (-1, 0), (-
1, 1), (-2, 2), (-5, 5), (0, 1), (0, 2), (2, 5), and (5, 20) Eventus is employed to run the basic daily 
event study and the results are reported in table XVIII on page 53. We divide the sample into 
terciles according to firms’ governance rating; (i) Low rated (1 ≤ rating < 4), (ii) Moderately rated 
(4 ≤ rating < 7), and (iii) High rated (7 ≤ rating ≤ 10). Results (presented in table XVII on page 
51 
 
45) for ‘all firms’ group showed that high rated firms have significantly low cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement dates. When we observe the results of different terciles, it becomes 
clear that results for ‘all firms’ group are largely driven by ‘high-rated firms’ group as low-rated 
and moderately –rated terciles had non-significant results mostly. However, results for 
moderately-rated tercile shows positive significant cumulative abnormal returns for the window 
(2, 5) but negative significant results for (-2, 0) and (5, 20). Contrary to our expectations, firms in 
the high-rated tercile have significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns especially in the 
pre- and around- announcement windows; (-20, -5), (-2, 0), (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 2), implying that 
some information was ‘leaked’ well before the announcement date. One possible explanation for 
this is that the ratings announcement of firms with good ratings was taken as a negative signal by 
the market as information about these firms’ governance practices was well-known, so there was 
no ‘new’ information (in governance ratings) for the market. So the market penalizes high-rated 
firms for using the valuable shareholder resources to pay for getting rated for something that was 
already known. Another possible explanation for these results could be that the market does not 
consider governance ratings announcements as ‘new’ information since the information used to 
rate firms’ governance is already well-known and there is no uncertainty involved. Therefore, the 
market had already incorporated the information about firms’ governance factors in equity 
valuation and prices even without the use of these governance ratings. Our results for the previous 
section, where we observe no significant change in information asymmetry level, are also 
consistent with the possibility that governance ratings are not any ‘new’ information for the 
market even when they are announced for the very first time for a firm. Thus, we find no support 






TABLE XVII: Information Asymmetry level - GMI Firms with Initial Rating Announcements 
The following table presents the results for change in information asymmetry around first rating received after having 
subscribed with GMI. Change in information asymmetry is calculated as the difference between pre- and post- 
information asymmetry proxies for the following and most recent period available. For bid-ask and share turnover, 
monthly data is used and for dispersion, forecast error, and normalized forecast error, quarterly data is used. 
Information asymmetry proxies are calculated in the following manner; (i) bid-ask spread as the difference between 
closing bid and closing ask for the most recent month available, (ii) share turnover ratio is the ratio of total trading 
volume during the most recent month available to number of shares outstanding, (iii) Dispersion in analyst forecast is 
calculated as the standard deviation of all available earnings forecasts, (iv) Analyst forecast error is the difference 
between actual earnings per share value and average earning per share forecast, and (v) Normalized error is the forecast 
error divided by average earnings volatility of firms quarterly earnings during the last three years. Finally, asterisks 
(***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 5%, and (*) represents significance at 10%.  
 N Mean Max Min Range Std Dev t Value Pr > |t| 
         
All firms         
Δ Bid ask spread 
Δ Share turnover 
Δ Dispersion 
Δ Forecast error 


















































         
Low rated (1 ≤ rating < 4)         
Δ Bid ask spread 
Δ Share turnover 
Δ Dispersion 
Δ Forecast error 


















































         
Moderate rate (4 ≤ rate < 7)         
Δ Bid ask spread 
Δ Share turnover 
Δ Dispersion 
Δ Forecast error 


















































         
High rated (7 ≤ rating ≤ 10)         
Δ Bid ask spread  
Δ Share turnover 
Δ Dispersion 
Δ Forecast error 






















































TABLE XVIII: Cumulative Abnormal Returns - GMI Firms with Initial Rating Announcements 
The table below presents average of daily value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns for GMI firms. Daily (basic) 
event study methodology was employed for GMI firms with initial rating announcements and abnormal returns were 
calculated using rating announcement date as the event date. The numbers in the table represent the average value 
weighted cumulative abnormal returns of initial rating firms. The columns represent results for the whole sample and 
also for low-rated, moderately-rated, and high rated firms. The sample was divided into terciles based on firms’ first 
governance rating. The numbers in parentheses below each CAR (cumulative abnormal return) represent the respective 
p-values. Finally, asterisks (***) represents significance at 1%, (**) represents significance at 5%, and (*) represents 
significance at 10%. 
 All firms Low rated firms 
(1 ≤ rating < 4) 
Moderate rated 
firms 
( 4 ≤ rating < 7 ) 
High rated 
firms 





    
(-20, -5) 
t-value 
positive : negative 
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Around announcement CARs 
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t-value 
positive : negative 
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(5, 20) 
t-value 
positive : negative 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempt to fill a gap in governance ratings literature by investigating different 
aspects of cross-sectional relationship between commercial governance ratings and information 
asymmetry in capital markets. Our results can be divided into four parts. First, we find strong 
support for the relationship between ISS index and industry ratings and firms’ contemporaneous 
information asymmetry proxies even when we control for firm size, tangibility, leverage, and 
profitability. Analysis is also performed on a yearly  basis to check for robustness of this 
relationship. For GMI, weak evidence is found for the relationship between governance ratings 
and information asymmetry proxies, especially when the analysis is performed on yearly basis. 
Second, the direction of  this cross- sectional relationship could not be determined. Third, we do 
not find significant support for change (reduction) in firms’ information asymmetry level when 
GMI firms get their very first rating. Fourth, cumulative abnormal returns around the ratings 
announcement s are negatively related to ratings for firms which get rated for the first time. This 
implies that the market punishes firms with high governance ratings and rewards firms with low 
ratings. This finding was contrary to our third hypothesis. Our investigation of the possible 
relation between corporate governance ratings announcements and contemporaneous information 
asymmetry proxies yields some meaningful results and also opens up many possibilities for future 
research. We find that ISS index and industry main scores are significantly related to analyst-
related and market-related information asymmetry proxies for the sample period from 2005 
through 2011. We also find weak support for this relationship for GMI’s overall global score. For 
both GMI and ISS, firm size and profitability are significantly positively related to governance 
ratings. Going forward, we believe that this topic deserves more attention from fellow researchers 
so that effectiveness of governance ratings could be understood from a market micro-structure 
too. Understanding of this concept is crucial to improve the effectiveness and usefulness of 
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A.1   ISS Ratings methodology details10 
 
Executive and Director Compensation: Executive and director compensation are considered by 
ISS while calculating their governance scores. They consider if an option plan requires a 
shareholders’ approval or not and option plan’s dilution cost is calculated by using SVT 
(Shareholder value transfer) and VPD (voting power dilution). They also consider if a company 
has a history of re-pricing stock options with sharheolders’ approval. Compensation paid to 
outside directors and existence of a pension plan for nonemployee directors ia also considered as 
a part of ISS scores.  
 
Director and Officer Ownership: Stock ownership among directors and the amount of stock 
owned by directors after one year of service are considered while the corporate governance 
quotient is calculated. ISS also considers the percentage of company shares of the total 
outstanding shares are owned by officers and Directors. Whether a firm enforces any form of 
guidelines for stock ownership of officers and directors is also considered while calculating the 
corporate governance quotient. 
 
Board Structure and Composition: Many board practices are also considered by ISS which 
include; number of directors on the board, changes in board size if any, number of board on 
which the CEO or other directors are serving at the same time, and if any of the former CEOs can 
be a part of the board. There is a negative association between the number of board the directors 
are serving at one time and if the former CEO is allowed to be a part of the board. ISS score is 
positively affected if the positions of CEO and chairman are separated. Various other practices 
relating to board structure and its composition which are considered by ISS are as follows:   




 Cumulative voting 
 Board guidelines 
 Responses to shareholder proposals 
 
Director’s Education: ISS has also come up with its list of ‘accredited’ director education 
programs, for which if a Director qualifies, would affect the ISS corporate governance quotient 
positively.  
 
Qualitative Factors: A unique feature of ISS corporate governance quotient that it also uses some 
qualitative factors while calculating the governance score. Following are the qualitative factors 
that positively influence the corporate governance quotient:  
 Mandatory retirement for board members 
 Board performance review 
 CEO succession plan 
 Outside advisors available to the board 






A.2 GMI ratings methodology details11 
 
 
Topics Related to Executive and Director Compensation: 
GMI considers a few variables which tell if the board is performing its duties with regards to 
executive compensation. These categories are enlisted below:  
 Remuneration committee 
 Remuneration disclosure 
 CEO incentive pay 
 Senior management incentives 
 CEO remuneration disclosure 
 Board remuneration 
 Stock ownership guidelines 
 Director stock ownership 
 Cost of stock options 
 Potential dilution 
 
Analysis of compensation practices of a firm are also judged by the following points: 
 Is the remuneration committee wholly composed of non-executive board members? 
 Does the company disclose specific performance benchmarks? 
 Within the last three years, has the company either re-priced outstanding executive stock 
options or used a stock option exchange program in which senior management was 
allowed to participate? 
 Was the CEO's last annual bonus cut or capped in response to a decline in earnings or a 
loss? 




 Are there stock ownership guidelines for the CEO and the other members of the senior 
management team? 
 Are a portion of executive stock options granted with exercise prices set 5% or more 
above market value at the time of grant, or does the company require that executives 
already holding a certain amount of company stock pay a premium to exercise additional 
stock options? 
 Has the number of company shares held by the senior management decreased by 10 
percent or more over the last twelve months? 
 Does every board member own stock in the company? 
 What is the potential dilution as a result of stock options and related awards outstanding? 
 What is the total potential dilution as a result of stock options and related awards 
outstanding, plus options and other equity-based awards approved for grant but not yet 
granted? 
 
Topics Related to Board Structure and Practices 
Board accountability is evaluated using the following categories: 
 Board leadership 
 Board composition 
 Board elections 
 Pursuit of shareholder value 
 Review of corporate strategy 
 CEO evaluation 
 Succession planning 
 Governance committee 
 Corporate governance policies 
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 Board evaluations 
 Board meetings 
 Board procedures 
 Code of ethics 
 Scrutiny of related-party transactions 
 
Analysis of board practices is performed by GMI by using the following categories: 
 Does a committee of the board evaluate the performance of the board on a regular basis? 
 Does each board committee undertake an evaluation of its own performance on a regular 
basis? 
 Do board members undertake self-evaluations or evaluations of other board members on 
a regular basis? 
 Is training required for new board members? 
 Is there a limit to the total number of years an individual is able to serve as a board 
member, or 
 Is there a limit to the number of times a director is allowed to be re-elected to the board? 
 Have any directors served on the board for fifteen years or more? 
 Does the board have a policy concerning directors whose principal occupation has 
changed? 
 Has there been a related-party transaction involving the Chairman, CEO, President, COO 








A.3  Industry Classification system used by ISS 
 
MSCI and Standard & Poor’s (S&P), have introduced the GICS (The Global Industry 
Classification System) in joint collaboration. These standards were developed as a standard 
industry classification for use by the financial community throughout the world. The GICS 
consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries, and 154 sub-industries. This system of 
classification is along the same lines as ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) maintained by 




Code Sector Sub code Industry Groups 
10 Energy 1010 Energy 
15 Materials 1510 Materials 
20 Industrials 
2010 Capital Goods 
2020 Commercial & Professional Services 
2030 Transportation 
25 Consumer Discretionary 
2510 Automobiles and Components 
2520 Consumer Durables and Apparel 
2530 Consumer Services 






30 Consumer Staples 
3010 Food & Staples Retailing 
3020 Food, Beverage & Tobacco 
3030 Household & Personal Products 
35 Health Care 
3510 Health Care Equipment & Services 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 
40 Financials 
4010 Banks 
4020 Diversified Financials 
4030 Insurance 
4040 Real Estate 
45 Information Technology 
4510 Software & Services 
4520 Technology Hardware & Equipment 
4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 
50 Telecommunication Services 5010 Telecommunication Services 
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A.4  ISS 61 governance variables used13 
Board  
1 Board Composition  
2 Nominating Committee  
3 Compensation Committee  
4 Governance Committee 
5 Board Structure 
6 Board Size  
7 Changes In Board Size* 
8 Cumulative Voting 
9 Boards Served On – CEO 
10 Boards Served On – Other Than CEO* 
11 Former CEO’s  
12 Chairman/CEOs Separation 
13 Board Guidelines 
14 Response To Shareholder Proposals  
15 Board Attendance*  
16 Board Vacancies* 




18 Audit Committee  
19 Audit Fees* 





20 Auditor Rotation* 
21 Auditor Ratification*  
 
Charter/Bylaws  
22-27 Features of Poison Pills  
28-29 Vote Requirements 
30 Written Consent 
31 Special Meetings 
32 Board Amendments 
33 Capital Structure 
 
State of incorporation 
 
33-40 Takeover Provisions Applicable Under State Law - Has Company Opted Out? 
 
Executive and Director Compensation 
 
41 Cost of Option Plans 
42-43 Option Re-pricing 
44 Shareholder Approval of Option Plans 
45 Compensation Committee Interlocks 
46 Director Compensation 
47 Pension Plans For Non-Employee Directors 
48 Option Expensing* 
49 Option Burn Rate* 






51 Retirement Age for Directors 
52 Board Performance Reviews 
53 Meetings of Outside Directors 
54 CEO Succession Plan 




56 Directors resign upon job change 
57 Director Ownership 
58 Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines 
59 Director Stock Ownership Guidelines 





61 Director Education 
 
 
 
 
 
